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Zoe Samudzi discusses the political staying power of President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe.
Throughout the course of his thirty-six years in office, President Robert Mugabe has used coercion and violence
to clear the Zimbabwean political arena of opposition and dissent and consolidate his political power. He has
singularly blamed the deteriorating economy on western sanctions rather than responsibly attributing it also to
his own inadequate planning, mismanagement of both capital and resources, his allowance of economic
liberalisation and structural adjustment, and political corruption. Yet, contrary to the singularly critical narratives
that tend to dominate, he enjoys some earnest support beyond what western reports about stolen elections
indicate.
In conversations related to Zimbabwe, a binary has been constructed between two clear
ideological camps: between dogmatic supporters and that of Western states. His supporters, including
“revolutionary” camps, sing his praises because of his anti-Western rhetoric and purported anti-imperialist
politics, as well as his land reform project. The West decries his political repression and violation of human
rights, election-rigging, and his turn towards the east to facilitate the country’s development. The truth about
President Mugabe is an amalgam of political realities, and central to the narrative is the complicated and under-
discussed relationship between the president and the people of Zimbabwe.
Despite his political track record, President Mugabe has not weathered sustained protests around regime
change. Beyond fears of his demonstrated willingness to use violence to eliminate opposition, I believe this can
be explained, at least partially, by a combination of four factors: state narratives around political sovereignty,
differential understandings of freedom, the absence of unifying class consciousness, and a lack of a unified
political opposition.
Robert Mugabe, then Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, admires a Maori carving, a gift from the government of New Zealand, during his country’s
independence celebrations on 18 April 1980
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Following independence in April 1980, a number of political concessions were made in the name of
“reconciliation” and laid out in the Lancaster House Agreement, which was largely seen as a set of compromises
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as white power structures went largely undisrupted. Most critically, the land issue – an issue of indigenous
sovereignty, and perhaps the most unifying politic of Black resistance to colonial rule – went
unaddressed. President Mugabe’s refusal to resign or allow regime change is justified, in part, by an idea that
the revolution was stalled, and there must be consistent leadership in its continuity. It is no mistake that the
ongoing process of land repossession and reform is characterised as the Third Chimurenga, and it is no accident
that such vehement western critique has been levelled at state policy (genuine or otherwise) seeking to regain
land sovereignty.
ZANU-PF is the party of the revolution, and the president continues to instrumentalise that legitimate legacy to
self-confer a lifetime mandate, one not contestable by election defeat. As Simukai Chigudu has previously
written, the president uses a narrative of “patriotic history” to legitimise himself and the party as “an ongoing
vanguard of Zimbabwean liberation against an external and [neo-]colonial threat as represented by the
West.” The party’s refusal to concede to Morgan Tsvangirai in 2008 stems from a national identity-narrative of
opposition to the West’s attempt to once again usurp native self-determination. Tsvangirai was supported by the
western states, most notably the United Kingdom, and the latter is both legitimately and exaggeratedly the
targets of political demonisations.
Because independence was achieved less than forty years ago, memories of subjugation under colonial
governance are still visceral for many people. Beyond memories from lived experience, there has been an
intergenerational transfer of memory to those born after the fall of white rule. There are, in a number of ways,
some direct tensions between more “abstracted” understandings of freedom and universal human rights (due, in
some part, to resentments around institutions perceived as “Western impositions”) and the clearer “freedom” that
is independence from colonial rule and the opportunity to access resources that would be otherwise rendered
inaccessible by the Rhodesian government. This is not to imply Zimbabwean people do not understand or desire
political transparency or press freedom or any other political entitlements or rights that may be characterised as
“Western,” but rather to attempt to parse through the relationship many people have with the relatively young
postcolonial institutions.
Another component to this lack of sustained political mobilisations is an erosion of class consciousness resulting
from high levels of formal sector unemployment, most notably an absence of formalised industrial labour forces.
With much of the country participating in extra-state informal labour, many people cannot sacrifice valuable work
time for political activity (compensated participation in political activity, however, is another story). And with the
emigration of a potential vanguard professional/middle class out of Zimbabwe, many of the calls for or deeply
sustained conversations around regime change exist within the diaspora, which is inadequate for meaningful
internal mobilisation.
Finally, the splintering of political opposition prevents the emergence of a unified popular voice. Former Vice
President Joice Mujuru has formed her own party following her expulsion from ZANU-PF in 2015, and the
factionalism emerging from MDC is nearly impossible to follow. The #ThisFlag movement attempted to construct
a unified non-partisan agenda under the banner of Zimbabwean nationalism. But these energies have thus
far failed to translate into actionable political and electoral items and the movement’s momentum has largely
fizzled since the protests throughout the second half of 2016.
The succession battle is raging on as President Mugabe’s long belated departure from office draws near. As a
new leader vies for power and the country transitions into a new era of governance, it is critical to understand
how social conditions, historical narratives, and political institutions have been weaponised to ensure political
monopoly by the ruling party.
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